CO129-614-1 Commission of Inquiry into fire at West Point- report 26-5-1949 - 22-12-1949 — Page 37

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taken. We understand that it is the duty of senior officers at a fire

to ensure the safety of life, and Mr. Tiplady, the Acting Deputy Chief Officer, told us that it is the responsibility of senior officers to

take action personally if necessary. We were told that all officers

were competent to carry out rescue work. At the time of the Chief Of-

ficer's arrival on the scene there were engaged in rescue operations throe responsible officers, Deputy Chief officer Tiplady, Divisional

Officer Browne and Station Officer Wong, the former two personally in-

volved. Mr. Brand also concentrated his efforts on rescue operations. We can understand his anxiety that no efforts should be spared to save

life, but we consider that, if the Chief Officer himself wished to take

personal responsibility for the rescue operations, the responsibility

for the general supervision of the fire area should have been delegated to one of three senior officers already present. If this had been done,

it is possible that the urgency of the action to be taken in godown No. 2 might have been appreciated at an earlier stage.

36. In our opinion the only possible way to have prevented the utter

destruction of the contents of godown No. 2 was to have tackled the var-

ious fires within it at source in their very earliest stages, and, in

view of the fire burning in the scavenging lane at the rear and the mer-

chandise piled up high against the windows in Whitty Street, the only

way in which this could be done was to effect an entry into the godown

through the doors or windows on the seafront side. The Chief Officer

told us that he was anxious not to admit air unnecessarily, but we think

that to have been able to play hoses in the neighbourhood of the flames

themselves, rather than on the walls of the building, might have been

worth the risk of admitting more air. Instructions were eventually given

to the officer in charge of the fire floats to break in the centre door

of godown No. 2 and this was done with crowbars, It is difficult to es-

tablish the exact time when ingress to the godown was effected, but it

was almost certainly after nine o'clock, and probably about 0915. If

an entry had been made between 0830 and 0845 and if hoses had been brought

in then, we consider that there might have been a chance to save this

godown.